Though the principle of A2/AD has been around for centuries, the phrase actually dates back to 2003 when the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment report stated, “anti-access (A2) strategies aim to prevent US forces entry into a theater of operations, then area-denial (AD) operations aim to prevent their freedom of action in the narrow confines of the area under an enemy’s direct control.” Founded in concepts and strategy, conflict in an A2/AD environment has yet to bridge the gap to manifest itself in operational art, preventing the Joint Force from converting the idea into tactical tasks and stifling operational agility and coherence in future conflict. The predominant phrase used to describe this growing threat environment-anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)-is indiscriminate and problematic.
Nations with growing military power have adapted accordingly, leveraging technology to grow increasingly capable threats to counter US force projection. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm showcased the modern US military for all to see-and the world was watching. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, China PLA, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999 If they want to guarantee their position in the field of military reforms that has already begun and will be completed right away, then the first thing that must be resolved is to eliminate the lag that exists between US military thinking and military technology.
